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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

FINALITY OF ORDERS AND DECREES OF
THE COUNTY COURTS OF WISCONSIN
IN PROBATE MATTERS
By

PROFESSOR WILLIS

E. LANG, B.Litt., LL.B., of the Marquette
College of Law

It is the purpose of this article to discuss briefly the finality of
the orders and decrees of the county courts of Wisconsin so far as
they relate to matters of probate of wills and the administration of
estates. However, it may not be out of place, in this connection, to
state the origin of the probate jurisdiction of our county courts.
Jurisdiction Vested by the Constitution. The Wisconsin
constitution by Article VII, Section 2, provides:
Judicial Power Where Vested. Section 2. The judicial power of this
state, both as to matters of law and equity, shall be vested in a supreme
court, circuit courts, courts of probate, and justices of the peace. The
legislature may also vest such jurisdiction as shall be deemed necessary
in municipal courts, and shall have power to establish inferior courts in
the several counties, with limited civil and criminal jurisdiction, and by
Article VII, Section i4, it is provided:
Judges of Probate. Section 14. There shall be chosen in each county,
by the qualified electors thereof, a judge of probate, who shall hold office
for two years and until his successor shall be elected and qualified, and
whose jurisdiction, powers and duties shall be prescribed by law. Provided, however, that the legislature shall have power to abolish the office
of judge of probate in any county, and confer probate powers upon such
inferior courts as may be established in said county.

The sections above quoted give the legislature the power to
establish inferior courts in any county, confer probate jurisdiction
upon them, and abolish the office of probate judge in that county.
This in effect gave the legislature the power to establish courts
in the various counties inferior to the circuit court, with such
jurisdiction as was thought necessary to meet the requirements,
but the legislature was obligated to maintain in each county, a

court of probate jurisdiction.
Probate Jurisdiction Conferred on County Courts. Shortly
after the adoption of the constitution, the legislature accordingly
established the county courts and provided for their jurisdiction.
(See Chapter 86 R. S. 1849.) By Section 3 of that chapter, it was
provided that these courts should have the powers and jurisdiction then by law conferred on the judges of probate, and that the
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judges thereof should perform all the duties of the judges of
probate in the manner provided by law.
By Section 4 of that chapter the office of judge of probate was
abolished and the judges of probate were directed on January i,
i85o, to turn over all books, records, and papers belonging to their
offices, to the county judges of their respective counties, who from
that time were vested with full and exclusive probate powers.
Section 5 of the same chapter gave county courts the usual
powers of courts of record under the common law, except so far as
limited by statute, and full power to issue all legal process, proper
and necessary to carry into effect their jurisdiction.
The legislature has from time to time changed the jurisdiction
of the county courts, but they still have full and exclusive probate
jurisdiction. (See Chapter 114 R. S. i92i.)
Judgments of the County Court within the General Rule of
Freedom from Collateral Attack. The general rule, familiar to
every lawyer, that a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, unless reversed or
annulled in some proper proceeding, is not open to contradiction or
impeachment, in respect to its validity, verity, or binding effect, by
parties or privies, in any collateral action or proceeding, as stated
in 23 Cyc. 1055, is applicable to the judgments of the county
courts in Wisconsin. Barker vs. Barker, 14 Wis. 131 at 147.
Direct Attack upon Orders and Decrees of County Courts.
The orders and decrees of the county courts are of course subject
to reversal and revision upon appeal to the circuit court, in counties
having a population of less than fifteen thousand, and thence to
the supreme court, while in counties having a population of fifteen
thousands, or more, such orders and decrees are subject to revision
by appeal direct to the supreme court (see Section 4031 R. S.
1921.) provided said appeal is taken within sixty days after the
entry thereof. But the expiration of that time does not cut off the
right to appeal, for Section 4035 R. S. 1921 provides that,
If any person aggrieved by any act of the county court shall, from any
cause without fault on his part, have omitted to take his appeal according
to law the county court of the same county may, if it shall appear that
justice requires a revision of the case, on the petition of the party aggrieved
and upon such terms and within such time as it shall deem reasonable,

allow an appeal to be taken and prosecuted
same effect as though done seasonably; or
discretion reopen the case and grant a retrial
No such appeal or retrial shall be allowed

in like manner and with the
the county court may in its
of the matter complained of.
without reasonable notice to
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the party adversely interested, nor unless the petition therefor shall be
filed in the office of the clerk of the county court within one year after
the act complained of. Whenever the county court shall allow or disallow
an appeal, or retrial, as provided in this section, the party aggrieved may
appeal therefrom.
From a reading of this statute it will be seen that after the
expiration of the sixty-day period and within the year the court
can allow an appeal or a retrial of the matter if it shall be made
to appear that "justice requires a revision of the case." This
would seem to place the matter entirely within the discretion of
the court to determine whether such relief should be granted, but
the fact that such determination is expressly made appealable by
the closing lines of the section, it would seem that the court must
act cautiously, and grant the relief in every case that justice requires and only in such cases, otherwise, its determination in
granting, or refusing to grant the relief, whichever the case may
be, would be subject to revision upon appeal. It therefore seems
that the effects of this statute is to extend the time for appeal from
orders and decrees of the county courts to the full period of one
year, for in order for the appellate court to determine the appeal
from the order granting or refusing to grant the appeal or retrial,
whichever the case may be, it must determine whether or not
"justice requires a revision of the case." In order to determine
this question, the court must pass upon the merits of the original
case, for, the appellate court will never disturb a determination of
a lower court unless justice requires it.
To construe the statute otherwise would lead to this absurdity:
An appeal is taken to the supreme court from the order of the
county court refusing to allow an appeal after the expiration of
the sixty-day period. The supreme court determines that the
county court was in error in this refusal and remands the record to
the county court with directions to allow the appeal. The county
court would then be obliged to obey instructions and send the
record back to the aupreme court. When the record arrived
there, the supreme court would be compelled to examine the very
same record as was before it upon the previous appeal and then
send it back again to the county court with directions to grant a
retrial or such other relief as justice might require. It cannot be
expected that our court would indulge in any construction of the
statute that would lead to this result.
We may then safely say that after the expiration of one year
from the entry of an order or decree of the county court, it is free
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from revision or annullment in so far as the record upon which it
is based is concerned. It being so free from liability to change,
anyone may rely upon its validity unless he has knowledge of facts
outside the record that would impeach its validity, or unless he is
a party to the record. This leads us to a consideration of the
effect of fraud in the procuring the entry of such an order or
decree.
Effects of Fraud upon the Finality of an Order or Decree of
the County Court. It is a fundamental principle that fraud
which induces the entry of an order, judgment, or decree of a
court renders it voidable by the party injured, but that the judgment will not be set aside for fraud inducing its entry, where to
do so would prejudice the rights of innocent purchasers for value
without notice of the fraud.
The Staab Will Case, 166 Wis. 587 is a good example of the
vacation of an order induced by fraud upon the court. In that
case the proponents of a will introduced testimony of the testimentary capacity of the testatrix, when they in fact knew that she
was wholly incompetent to make a will, the testimony therefore
being perjured. Upon application of one of the heirs of the alleged
testatrix, the court set aside the order admitting the will to probate,
and granted administration of the estate. The supreme court, in
affirming this determination of the county court in part said,
The mere fact that the year had gone by in which a formal appeal might
be taken from the order admitting the will to probate, or that interested
persons, knowing the facts, concealed or withheld them from the court,
does not alter the position of the county court itself, having, as here, the
matter of the estate still before it to take the proper steps on its own
motion to determine whether or not there has been such fraud perpetrated
upon it under the guise of regular proceedings. While the estate is still
before the court for administration it is still before it to have its proceedings purged of fraud, and the mere passing of the time within which
parties might appeal to another tribunal is immaterial.

It is to be noted that the rights of no innocent purchaser for
value was involved in this case, and the court expressly limits the
application of the rule to those cases in which the innocent purchaser's rights are not involved, and to those cases in which the
rights of the innocent purchaser can be protected.
The Reeves Case, 186 N. W. 736 recently decided by the
supreme court, is interesting from the standpoint or rather lack of
finality of the decree of the county court. In this case it was
sought to set aside guardianship proceedings in county court and
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be retrieved from a stipulation with the guardian, upon a showing
that there was no ward in fact and that the alleged ward was an
impostor. The court purged its records of the alleged guardianship proceedings. And the supreme court in sustaining this
position held that a decree of the probate court may be subsequently annulled when clearly shown to be without foundation in
law or fact.
In order to perpetrate the fraud upon the court in the guardianship proceedings, the supposed mother of the imposed ward allowed an order of the county court, prejudical to her interest, to be
entered, and the supreme court relieved her from this order.
The court, however, points out that the vacation of the decree
of the county court must be sought in that court because of its
peculiar and broad equity powers resting upon the proposition that
the deceased person who has disposed of his property, is always a
silent party to the proceedings, and it is the supreme duty of
courts of probate to carry his wishes into effect wherever they are
not inconsistent with law and public policy.
A reading of the cases mentioned, to say nothing of cases from
other jurisdictions in accord with them, will show that a decree or
order of the county court has no finality where fraud lurks and
where the question is raised directly. In fact, so potent is the
power of the county court to set things right that relief will be
granted to the very person who has fraudulently procured the
order to be entered.

